

Differentially Private Normalizing Flows for Privacy-Preserving Density Estimation

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Introduction

Density Estimation

 Want to estimate underlying probability distribution of observed data, enabling likelihood estimation and sampling

Data Privacy

- Learning and releasing such an estimate could leak potentially sensitive information if data is linked to individuals
- Solution: release estimate with differential privacy [1] guarantee, where change in distribution of our estimate due to removal of a single individual (D vs. D') is bounded:

 $\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in \mathcal{S}] \le \exp(\epsilon) \Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') \in \mathcal{S}] + \delta$

Existing Baselines

 DP-EM [2], which enables privacy-preserving Gaussian mixture models (DP-MoG) through expectation maximization

Approach

Learning Invertible Transformations

 Idea: optimize a sequence of invertible transformations, mapping simple prior distribution to a complex distribution

$$\log p_{\boldsymbol{ heta}}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \log q(f_{\boldsymbol{ heta}}^{-1}(\boldsymbol{x})) + \log \left|\det\left(rac{\partial f_{\boldsymbol{ heta}}^{-1}(\boldsymbol{x})}{\partial \boldsymbol{x}}
ight)
ight|$$

 Optimize parameters to minimize negative log likelihood of the data, achieving a privacy guarantee via DP-SGD [3]:

$$\mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{ heta}) := -rac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^N \log p_{\boldsymbol{ heta}}(\boldsymbol{x}^{(i)})$$

Prior

• Simplistic choice of Gaussian can be improved upon by fitting a Gaussian mixture model using DP-EM to act as prior

Model Architecture

 Masked Autoregressive Flow [4], which composes a sequence of MADE and activation normalization layers

Results





Figure 2: Average log likelihood on a held out test set from the Life Science dataset as a function of the cumulative privacy loss ϵ .

Synthetic Data Generation



Figure 3: Dimension-wise histograms of synthetically generated Life Science data, superimposed over real data, for $\varepsilon = 0.6$ and $\delta = 1.52 \times 10^{-5}$. Left column is our algorithm; right column is our baseline DP-MoG.

Application: Anomaly Detection

Anomaly Detection as Density Estimation

 Can approach anomaly detection through a simple likelihood thresholding mechanism; predicts in-distribution or out-of-distribution depending on whether density exceeds some empirically derived threshold

Experiment

 Generated synthetic anomalies by uniformly sampling points at tail ends of the observed data distribution; proposed approach performs better than DP-MoG and comparably to a non-private mixture of Gaussians



Figure 4: ROC curves displaying true positive rate and false positive rate for private and non-private likelihood threshold models. Privacy expenditure was calculated using the moments accountant with $\delta = 1.52 \times 10{-}5$.

References

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[3] M. Abadi, A. Chu, I. Goodfellow, H. B. McMahan, I. Mironov, K. Talwar, and L. Zhang. Deep learning with differential privacy. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 308–318. ACM, 2016.

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